Stanford, Calif. : Stanford Law Books, 2011.
KIC 340.1 B355H 2011
335 pages ; 24 cm.
Though many legal theorists are familiar with Jürgen Habermas's work addressing core legal concerns, they are not necessarily familiar with his earlier writings in philosophy and social theory. Because Habermas's later work on law invokes, without significant explanation, the whole battery of concepts developed in earlier phases of his career, even otherwise sympathetically inclined legal theorists face significant obstacles in evaluating his insights.
New York, NY : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2017.
KIC 347.012 D997 2017
This book examines the legal principle of judicial independence in comparative perspective with the goal of advancing a better understanding of the idea of an independent judiciary more generally. From an initial survey of judicial systems in different countries, it is clear that the understanding and practice of judicial independence take a variety of forms. Scholarly literature likewise provides a range of views on what judicial independence means, with scholars often advocating a preferred conception of a model court for achieving `true judicial independence¿ as part of a rule of law system. This book seeks to reorient the prevailing approach to the study of judicial independence by better understanding how judicial independence operates within domestic legal systems in its institutional and legal dimensions. It asks how and why different conceptualisations of judicial independence emerge over time by comparing detailed case studies of courts in two legally pluralistic states, which share inheritances of British rule and the common law.